The panel heard a land‑use dispute over a 29‑acre Westminster parcel that counsel says has been used primarily for forest and lumber operations. Appellant counsel told the court the property meets the bylaw's definition — "the growing and harvesting of forest products upon forest land" — and noted a state‑approved forest cutting plan and certificate. He argued that timber takes decades to mature and that the bylaw and state exemption (cited as follows from M.G.L. c.40A/§3 language in briefing) should allow processing and use of Massachusetts‑sourced material, even if not every board member's wording contemplates 100% on‑site production.

Opposing counsel for the town relied on controlling precedent (including Rowley and other land‑court and appellate decisions) that distinguishes on‑site production from off‑site manufacture and cautioned that allowing large quantities of off‑site raw material to be processed on a residential parcel risks converting agriculture into light manufacturing. The town sought affirmance of the superior court's decision that the operation was not an agricultural use as a matter of right and that bringing in significant off‑site product was an unacceptable incidental use.

Justices pressed both sides on statutory text and precedent: whether the 25% and related thresholds in the agricultural exemption apply in different contexts (farm stands vs. forestry), whether the bylaw language was ambiguous, and how much deference to accord local board findings when the superior court reviewed the board de novo. Counsel disagreed about whether 1/3 on‑site production (appellant's affidavit) vs. the inspector's finding that most material was off‑site was dispositive. The panel took the case under advisement.