The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals (Eastern Section) heard oral argument on an appeal of a trial courts sua sponte grant of a new trial to James Elvis Presley, a defendant convicted of second-degree murder. Appellate counsel for the State, Will Lundy, urged the court to reverse the trial court and reinstate Presleys convictions, saying the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard when it granted a new trial after receiving post-trial testimony from Dr. William Oliver, who performed the autopsy.

Lundy summarized the trial record, noting the victim was found dead on a couch with extensive facial and head injuries and that blood was found under the brim of the defendants cap. He told the panel that the trial court expressly "refused to find that the new evidence here was likely to change the outcome of the trial," and argued that, because the court did not make the requisite finding, "the trial court abused its discretion when it granted the defendant a new trial." (Will Lundy).

Appellate counsel for Presley, William Gill, acknowledged the trial court has authority under Rule 33 to grant a new trial sua sponte but contended the record contains a legal basis for the order. Gill said the newly produced testimony of Dr. Oliver, the forensic pathologist who performed the autopsy, was not merely impeachment or cumulative but could lead a jury to accept an alternate account of causation and mens rea. "The newly discovered evidence in this case warrants a new trial because it is likely that a jury accepting Dr. Oliver's testimony would reach a different outcome, such as a conviction on the lesser included offense of reckless homicide," Gill told the court.

Counsel and the three-judge panel debated the applicable standard for relief. The parties and judges discussed whether the Rule 33 standard for newly discovered evidence (often framed as whether the evidence is "likely to change the result of the trial") differs materially from coram nobis standards (which the State described as requiring only a "mere possibility" of a different result). The State pointed to precedent including State v. Workman and Nichols-type analyses to argue the trial court effectively applied the narrower coram nobis approach and therefore erred. The defense cited State v. Gosswick and the Tennessee Supreme Court's later decisions (including State v. Hall) to argue that a reviewing court must assume the jury would accept the newly produced evidence when applying the Rule 33 standard.

A central factual dispute before the panel was the difference between Dr. Oliver's testimony and the testimony presented at trial by Dr. Dorynka Malusnick (the medical examiner who testified at trial) and the impressions offered by Dr. Karen Whitaker, an emergency physician. The State outlined three distinguishing points identified from Dr. Oliver's testimony: (1) Malusnick concluded the victim had been beaten with an object, while Oliver concluded she had not been beaten with an object; (2) Malusnick found many injuries inconsistent with a fall, whereas Oliver described the most serious injuries as "strongly suggestive of a fall;" and (3) Malusnick testified the injuries would have immediately incapacitated the victim, while Oliver said he could not determine whether the victim might have been ambulatory in the hours before death.

Defense counsel emphasized trial-court findings that Dr. Oliver was credible, that his expertise was comparable to Dr. Malusnick's, and that his opinions could supplant the trial testimony. Gill argued that if a jury accepts Oliver's opinion that the most serious injuries were consistent with a fall and that highly intoxicated persons are "notorious for falling down and getting brain bleeds," that finding could support a lesser mens rea and a conviction for reckless homicide instead of knowing second-degree murder.

The State countered that even accepting Dr. Oliver's testimony, a jury could reasonably conclude Presley was guilty of second-degree knowing homicide, because Dr. Oliver also described blunt-force trauma and stated the death was a homicide. Lundy said Oliver did not describe the death as an accident and that the extent of injuries could still support a knowing mens rea.

The panel questioned both sides about whether Dr. Oliver's testimony would be merely cumulative of Dr. Whitakers testimony (an emergency physician who had not performed the autopsy) or whether Oliver's role as the autopsy performer gave his testimony independent, noncumulative weight. Counsel also debated whether the trial court explicitly applied the wrong standard and whether the courts written order sufficiently explained its reasoning.

No ruling was issued from the bench. The court took the case under advisement after hearing approximately 20 minutes of argument per side and asking follow-up questions about precedent and standards. The principal formal action underlying the appeal is the trial courts sua sponte grant of a new trial based on Dr. Olivers post-trial testimony; on appeal the State seeks reversal and reinstatement of the convictions, while the defendant urges affirmation and remand for a new trial.

The panel called the next case after counsel rested; the Court of Criminal Appeals will issue its decision in a written opinion.