An interim investigation presented to the Richmond City Council's Organizational Development Standing Committee on March 3 found that a January outage at the Richmond Water Treatment Plant began with a mechanical failure in a switchgear bus tie and was compounded by inadequate backup power programming, limited dewatering capacity and gaps in staffing, training and communications, HNTB representatives said.

The interim report, delivered by Robert Page, vice president with HNTB, says the event began after Main Feeder 1 lost power and a mechanical failure prevented an automatic transfer to the second feeder. That left the plant dependent on uninterruptible power supply units and manually operated generators. The report says UPS units did not close filter effluent valves during the outage, allowing water to flood the basement, submerge electrical equipment and take the plant offline.

Why it matters: the outage led to a system-wide disruption and a boil-water advisory affecting Richmond and wholesale customers; the report frames immediate technical fixes that city staff have already begun while identifying further capital, staffing and procedural changes to reduce the risk of a repeat event.

HNTB's on-the-ground findings and recommendations

HNTB told the committee it conducted a plant tour, reviewed documents and interviewed 14 staff to date; it said the investigation is ongoing and the interim report may be revised. Key technical findings and recommendations include:

- Root cause: a mechanical failure in the closed-coil bus-tie in switchgear 6 and a failure of UPS programming that left the filter effluent valves open during loss of power.
- Power programming: operate the plant in a mode that preserves redundancy (described in the report as the 'summer mode'), develop a formal bus-tie failure plan, and change Plant 1 SCADA programming so valve closures on UPS power match Plant 2 behavior.
- UPS and generator sizing: provide a parallel backup UPS for critical filter-valve controls sized to a minimum 1-hour run time; evaluate an automatic transfer system for generators to reduce operator risk when an incoming feed remains live.
- Valve and dewatering safeguards: verify filter effluent valves are fail-safe closed or reprogram them to close, install high-level floats in clear wells to force valve closure when levels rise, fit valve actuators with watertight ratings and add visual and remote indicators to confirm valve position.
- Dewatering and electrical protections: install dewatering pumps able to keep pace with incoming gravity flow and raise critical electrical equipment above basement level where practical.
- Staffing and training: consider additional mechanical and electrical staff during high-risk storm periods, implement a 30-minute response-time protocol for maintenance staff, add a float operator to increase shift staffing from three to four, and develop formal SOPs and an accessible, scenario-specific emergency operations manual in compliance with the Virginia Administrative Code.
- Asset management and maintenance: develop an asset management plan, improve preventive-maintenance work orders and work-order detail, and reconcile maintenance access for operations staff.
- Communication: formalize an external-notification protocol for wholesale customers and other large users, review and update contact lists monthly, ensure staff have radios and clarify leadership and decision-making roles for incident responses.

Several recommendations already implemented

HNTB and city staff told the committee some changes already were put in place: Scott Morris, director of the Department of Public Utilities (DPU), said plant power-mode programming had been changed immediately to improve redundancy. HNTB also recommended additional near-term fixes and longer-term capital work, and it noted the SCADA control-system behavior is still under review.

Council questions and next steps

Council members pressed for clarity on the investigation's scope and underlying documentation. Council Member Gibson asked whether HNTB's assignment included detailed internal-communications review and e-mail correspondence; the presenter said HNTB would include internal communications where available and is comparing prior recommendations to actions taken.

Director Scott Morris told the committee the city is coordinating outstanding interviews and document requests, and that HNTB plans a final report for April 3 with a return to the committee on April 7. HNTB said it has reached out to former director Bingham and planned to schedule an interview with long-serving plant operator Bob Bridal.

Votes at a glance

- Motion to amend the agenda (continuing consideration of Resolution 2025-R-10 and appointments to boards and commissions to the April 7 meeting): approved by the committee.
- Approval of minutes from the Feb. 3, 2025 Organizational Development Standing Committee meeting (4 p.m.): approved as presented.

What the report does not yet resolve

HNTB and DPU officials repeatedly noted the interim nature of the report: the investigation is still seeking documentation and interviews, and HNTB said it will not necessarily trace why older recommendations (cited in prior plans) were not implemented in previous years. The firm said the final report will catalog prior recommendations and note which were completed and which were not, but it may not attempt to determine the administrative or budgetary rationale behind every historical decision.

What to watch for

HNTB said the final report is scheduled for release April 3 and that it will present an implementation matrix showing recommendations, responsible parties and target timelines. City staff said they are coordinating with the Virginia Department of Health (VDH) and EPA on outstanding items and will provide additional crosswalks of recommendations from state and federal reviewers where practical.

Ending

HNTB and DPU said they will return to the committee with the final report and an implementation crosswalk with state and federal findings. Interviews with former director Bingham and plant operator Bob Bridal were described as pending by HNTB.