The Virginia Supreme Court heard oral argument in Canales v. Commonwealth on whether probation technical violations can be treated as a single "course of conduct" for sentencing purposes or must be litigated as separate hearings, a question that could change how courts and probation officers handle multiple, noncriminal probation infractions.

Appellant's counsel Bradley R. Haywood argued the statute and Supreme Court precedent favor treating a probationer’s behavior as a broader pattern and assessing "substantial compliance," not strict adherence to each individual rule. "There’s a term 'substantial compliance,' and that is... from The United States Supreme Court. I believe that was from Morrissey versus Brewer," Haywood told the bench, arguing that counting each minor infraction separately could produce unjust results for people otherwise making progress on probation.

Victoria Johnson, senior assistant attorney general for the Commonwealth, countered that the circuit court retains supervisory power over its sentencing order and that the statute primarily limits sentencing exposure — most notably a 14-day cap the parties discussed — rather than how a court manages its docket. Johnson said the revocation process affords "notice and opportunity to be heard" and cited Gagnon and other precedents distinguishing limited due process in revocation proceedings from a full criminal prosecution.

The arguments turned on three related issues: (1) whether the "course of conduct" clause governs how many separate hearings a judge must hold or only the sentencing result once hearings occur, (2) whether a probation officer's decision to file one or many major violation reports effectively determines how many separate revocation hearings a defendant will face, and (3) how to reconcile judicial supervisory functions (including issuing capias or show-cause orders) with prosecutorial and probation-office charging practices.

Haywood warned of administratively burdensome and potentially punitive outcomes if prosecutors or probation officers can fragment alleged technical violations into separate major-violation reports ("14 different hearings, 14 different case numbers, 14 different bond hearings"). He said that approach would undermine the statutory purpose of limiting incarceration for technical violations. Johnson responded that nothing in the statute removed the court’s inherent power over docketing and that, even if hearings are successive, a court is foreclosed from imposing more than the statutory sentencing cap for a single course of conduct.

Justices pressed both advocates on practical sequencing: whether a judge who splits allegations into multiple proceedings can later consolidate them as a single course of conduct for sentencing, and whether defendants retain the right at each isolated hearing to argue aggregation. Counsel on both sides agreed the record facts can determine whether separate adjudications occurred and whether sentences were pronounced after interim hearings — factual details the justices flagged as important to resolving the legal question.

At several points the advocates and justices discussed equal-protection and separation-of-powers concerns: if probation officers routinely file reports at different intervals, similar probationers could face widely divergent treatment depending on administrative practice rather than a court’s assessment. The Virginia Association of Commonwealth’s Attorneys and the Virginia Criminal Sentencing Commission were cited by counsel as having described prior practice and legislative intent.

Oral argument concluded without a ruling from the bench. The justices did not announce a decision at argument; the court will issue an opinion in due course addressing whether and how the "course of conduct" provision limits hearings, sentencing exposure, and the balance of power between courts and probation officers.