At oral argument before the Supreme Court, Brad Haywood, appellant's counsel, said the trial court and the Court of Appeals improperly converted an issue of weight into one of admissibility by excluding psychiatric testimony that would tend to negate intent in the death‑and‑concealment prosecution of Mr. Shaw.

"The trial court invaded the province of the jury by turning an issue of weight into 1 of admissibility," Haywood told the justices, arguing the statute cited in briefing requires mental‑condition evidence to be admitted and evaluated by the jury on its weight. Haywood said the defense expert, Dr. Boyd, testified that Shaw's disordered thinking and inability to engage in planful conduct persisted across the three‑day period the body was concealed and that the expert's opinion tended to negate the malice and planning elements the Commonwealth relied on.

Virginia Tyson, assistant attorney general for the Commonwealth, responded that the trial court properly exercised its gatekeeping function and did not abuse its discretion in excluding the proffered testimony. "The trial court, as the gatekeeper of the admissibility of the evidence, carefully considered the matter and did not abuse its discretion in excluding the proffered evidence," Tyson said, adding that the Court of Appeals applied a standard similar to federal precedents requiring the expert to connect the mental condition at the time of the alleged conduct to a tendency to negate the required intent.

Both sides addressed how the time frame of the offense affects admissibility. The facts taken from argument: the victim's body was wrapped in a shower curtain and kept in an apartment for roughly three days (described in argument as May 5–8); the apartment's air conditioning was lowered to about 50 degrees; Shaw sent a text to a contact labeled "mom" saying he found the body and would not report it because he feared jail; and other phone messages and texts indicated another individual was advising Shaw about cleaning and concealment. Haywood argued Dr. Boyd's testimony tied the defendant's disorganized conduct—wrapping the body, lowering the temperature, asking others for help—to impaired planning and therefore tended to negate the malice and concealment intents the Commonwealth advanced.

Justices pressed both sides on hypotheticals about temporal precision. Justice Kelsey asked whether it was possible during the three‑day period that Shaw could nevertheless have "plan[ed] and act[ed], intentionally," and counsel acknowledged the expert had testified the condition was in flux and that she could not identify every discrete moment with certainty. The Commonwealth emphasized that many portions of the expert's proffer were speculative regarding the precise instant the criminal intent was asserted (for example, the moment police arrived and Shaw lied), and that experts may not be permitted to offer speculation in place of a demonstrable link to the required mens rea.

Counsel also debated harmless‑error analysis. Haywood argued that even limited testimony (for example, tying impairment to the 15‑minute period when Shaw spoke to police on the porch) could alter the jury's assessment of intent and therefore present a non‑harmless error if excluded. Tyson said the gatekeeping threshold must be met before harmless‑error considerations apply and that the trial court reasonably concluded the proffer did not adequately connect the mental condition to the specific intent elements the Commonwealth needed to prove.

No decision was issued at argument. The justices questioned whether multiple, temporally partial experts could, in combination, establish a continuous impairment across the full period, and whether exclusion of an expert whose testimony is imprecise on timing should be deemed an abuse of discretion. The court's eventual opinion will resolve whether the trial court and Court of Appeals applied the correct evidentiary standard and whether the proffered testimony should have reached the jury.