J.M. et al. v. A.A. et al. was argued before the Supreme Court on October 12, 2025, focusing on whether Virginia Code 63.2-1216, which blocks collateral attacks on final adoption orders after six months, prevents later challenges to an adoption involving a child transferred from Afghanistan and whether federal law or constitutional due-process principles displace that state statute.

John S. Moran, counsel for appellants J.M. and S.M., told the justices that "Code section 63.2-1216 squarely forecloses the A's collateral attack on the M's adoption" and urged the court to reverse the lower court and "remand to the circuit court with instructions to dismiss the petition." Moran framed the dispute as a statutory one that balances "correctness and finality," arguing the General Assembly struck that balance by limiting post-adoption collateral attacks after six months.

Britney M.J. Record, pro bono counsel for A.A. and F.A., countered that the circuit court lacked statutory authority and "the order of adoption was wholly outside the statutory adoption code," arguing the adoption did not fit any of the five statutory categories for adoption in Virginia and pointing to the absence of the child's physical presence in Virginia during the contested proceedings. Record told the justices she was unable to "see how the juvenile court was able to do what it did" and that, if the Virginia courts had no jurisdiction, the orders could be void and the parties should be restored to their prior positions.

A central legal question debated was whether the statute63.2-1216applies when an adoption order is alleged to have been entered without power to render or subject-matter jurisdiction. Moran argued that Virginia precedent and the text of the statute foreclose most post-six-month challenges, while Record urged the Court to recognize circumstances in which an order entered without statutory authority is not a "final order of adoption" for purposes of the statute.

Record also pressed two related federal-law theories: that the statute is preempted where a foreign-policy decision or a U.S. government determination about the child's placement conflicts with state law, and that due-process protections attach to parental relationships that the trial court recognized. Moran replied that there is no treaty or implementing federal statute that would, under the Supremacy Clause, automatically displace the Virginia statute and invoked the Supreme Court's Medellin decision to argue against a broad preemption theory.

The justices questioned both sides closely about several sub-issues: whether the Court of Appeals'prior decisions (including Nelson) allow a narrow exception where a biological parent with an existing relationship lacked notice of the adoption; whether doctrines such as "power to render," subject-matter jurisdiction, or personal-jurisdiction defects can be raised after an adoption has become final under the six-month rule; and what remedies would follow if the orders were declared void ab initio.

Counsel debated the factual record'including the circuit court's timeline and findings, how those findings were incorporated (or not) into final orders, and whether adjudications of foreign or customary law (including references to a "wali" under Afghan law and International Committee of the Red Cross involvement) established legal custody prior to the Virginia proceedings. Record pointed to the lower court's findings that the petitioners "have no court order or ruling by a judge granting in Afghanistan granting them legal custody" and emphasized that the adoption process in Virginia is "a creature of statute" with specific procedural prerequisites.

The court noted that the United States had been granted leave to file an amicus brief and to present argument, but the bench announced it had been informed that the attorney general was "reconsidering the position on the amicus brief and has directed Mr. Yellin not to present oral argument this morning." The absence of an on-the-record federal presentation was discussed as relevant to the preemption question.

No decision was announced from the bench. The argument canvassed statutory interpretation of Virginia Code 63.2-1216, the scope of federal supremacy in foreign-policy matters, the contours of due-process parental rights, and the practical consequences of declaring state adoption orders void.

Ending note: The case raises questions about the interplay of state adoption statutes, the proper bounds of collateral attack on final orders, and the extent to which foreign governmental or federal executive-branch determinations affect state-family-law adjudications. The Court's forthcoming opinion will determine whether Virginia's six-month statute of repose is absolute or admits exceptions where jurisdictional or constitutional defects are asserted.