The Supreme Court considered whether officers’ post-arrest search of Jeffrey Antonio Barlow—described by counsel as pulling back clothing in the transport van to inspect his pants—constituted a “strip search” or a more intrusive body-cavity search, and whether exigent circumstances (risk of destruction or ingestion of contraband) justified the search.

Abigail L. Paulus, appellant's counsel, argued the Court of Appeals’ standard was not satisfied before officers conducted the search. “They subjected him to a strip search without applying the court of appeal standard that there was a clear indication of evidence within the body cavity and without exigent circumstances,” Paulus said, asking the court to reverse.

Aaron J. Campbell for the Commonwealth countered that the law governing intrusive searches requires a threshold showing and then a Bell v. Wolfish-style reasonableness inquiry, but that the threshold in the Commonwealth’s view was satisfied. Campbell described the sequence: Barlow was arrested for possession of marijuana, placed in the transport van and, while alone in the van, was observed “digging into his pants looking for something.” The transport-van driver alerted officers, who removed Barlow and conducted a clothing search. Campbell argued the officers limited the search’s place, manner, and scope: “The place of the search was… the doors were shielded. It was a limited intrusion. They pulled back the pants. They looked inside.” He told the court officers later saw the defendant break from an officer and a bag of drugs “exploded… all over the concrete,” and officers later recovered the material.

Campbell urged the court to consider two elements: a “clear indication” (which he equated with probable cause in his oral argument) that contraband was concealed, and exigent circumstances to prevent destruction or ingestion. “Exigent circumstances… would be met in this case because… the individual would be harmed by this, by either busting open a bag of drugs or… ingesting them,” Campbell said, discussing concerns voiced by justices about fentanyl and whether the possibility of ingestion becomes a universal justification for intrusive searches.

Justices probed both sides on the test’s contours. One justice observed that some courts call similar maneuvers a “reach-in” or an “under the clothing search,” which other authorities treat as less than a strip search; others asked whether Gilmore, Craddock, Hubbard and McLeod lines required a higher threshold for body-cavity searches. Counsel for the Commonwealth said courts have applied the Bell factors (place, manner, scope, justification) across settings and that the presence of digging at the waistband and a subsequent explosion of contraband supported a finding of exigency.

Paulus disputed both the factual sufficiency and the legal threshold, noting the Court of Appeals had “assumed without deciding that there was a strip search” and nonetheless deemed it reasonable. She emphasized the need for the court to maintain a separate requirement for a clear indication and exigent circumstances before allowing intrusive searches of body cavities or similar highly invasive searches.

The advocates and justices also discussed whether labeling an encounter a strip search alters the required showing and whether the risk of fentanyl ingestion should change the calculus. Neither side suggested the court announce a different procedural step at argument; both urged the justices to apply established factors to the record facts. The bench did not render a decision at the hearing.