The Virginia Supreme Court heard oral argument over whether a plaintiffs filing for bankruptcy during a pending personal-injury case strips her of standing and renders the state-court lawsuit void.
Thomas Chappell, attorney for the appellants, told the court, "A party cannot proceed in litigation without standing. That's what we have here." Chappell said the plaintiff transferred her personal-injury claim to her bankruptcy estate and therefore "lost standing to continue to proceed pursue this action." He urged the court to apply Virginia standing doctrine as set out in prior decisions such as Coker.
Ben Bridal, attorney for appellee Fatima Shaw McDonald, countered that the claim reverted to his client under federal bankruptcy law once exempted assets were deemed unadministered. Bridal told the court, "This lawsuit was filed in a timely manner within the statute of limitations," and argued the claimants schedule amendments and the bankruptcy record show the personal-injury cause of action was listed as exempt and ultimately "reverted back to the debtor as of the day of filing." Bridal cited federal bankruptcy provisions governing abandonment and asked the court to defer to federal bankruptcy law on that point.
The argument centered on two competing legal propositions. Appellants' counsel urged a state-law rule that a plaintiff who ceases to own the claim while litigation is pending no longer has standing and the action becomes a nullity, pointing to Virginia precedent. Appellee counsel urged application of federal bankruptcy concepts including the doctrine that certain assets listed as unadministered are abandoned under 11 U.S.C. section 554(c) and related precedent and relied on older Supreme Court authority such as Brown v. O'Keefe.
Several justices pressed both sides on practical consequences. Multiple justices asked whether the loss of standing at a single point in time what one justice called the "millisecond" problem would force dismissal even if the trustee later abandoned the asset or the bankruptcy estate closed without administration. Appellate counsel told the court the lack of authority for treating bankruptcy differently from other causes-of-action transfers counseled applying Virginia standing principles strictly; appellee counsel said federal practice and published decisions support treating exempted, unadministered assets as reverting to the debtor and thus preserving the claim.
Counsel discussed specific facts in the record: the medical-malpractice suit was filed in 2019 and set for trial June 6, 2022; the bankruptcy petition was filed earlier in 2022 and the amended schedules listing the cause of action as exempt appear in the record; a final bankruptcy order entered in July 2022 and the estate was described in the briefs as unadministered. Appellee counsel pointed to an unpublished Virginia decision, Clark v. HealthTech, and to federal bankruptcy rules permitting amendment and abandonment as support for his position that the claim reverted to the plaintiff.
No formal decision was announced at argument. The justices repeatedly returned to two threads: (1) whether Virginia law must treat the interruption of ownership during pending litigation as a perpetual nullity or whether a reversion under federal bankruptcy practice can cure the interruption; and (2) what practical procedures a trial judge should follow if a bankruptcy filing appears during litigation for example, whether substitution of the trustee is possible, whether the state court must stay activity, or whether dismissal is required.
The court took the case under advisement and recessed the session; no opinion was read from the bench at the close of arguments.