The Virginia Supreme Court heard oral argument in Holston v. Commonwealth over whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion to suppress field sobriety-test results, statements and a breath test after officers approached the defendant on his home's curtilage.

Appellant counsel Mario Lorello argued that the encounter became a seizure before the tests and arrest, and that evidence obtained after that point should be suppressed. Lorello said the interaction should be viewed in three parts: the officers' entry onto the curtilage, the seizure he says occurred when officers directed the defendant to perform tests, and the subsequent arrest. "We are not contesting the lawfulness of the officer's entry onto the property," Lorello told the court, but he added that the officer's conduct thereafter "caused Mister Paulson to be seized." He told justices the trooper's phrasing "wanna do me a favor and take some SFSTs or field sobriety tests" may read as a question on paper but, when combined with the recording, tone and the officers' presence, amounted to a coercive command.

Lorello pressed that a later instruction — "step out in front of my vehicle, please" — showed the interaction had crossed the line into a seizure because multiple armed, uniformed officers were on the property at night and a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave. He also urged the court to consider Virginia court-of-appeals decisions applying the implied-consent statute, 18.2-268.2, which the appellant contends requires a lawful arrest before breath-test evidence can be compelled or relied upon.

Representing the Commonwealth, Mason Williams urged the court to affirm the trial court and court of appeals. Williams said the encounter was consensual and noncoercive and that officers were lawfully present on the curtilage under an implied license or consent so they were not required to obtain a warrant before making an arrest once probable cause developed. "The defendant was not seized or in custody during the course of this consensual and non coercive encounter," Williams told the court, arguing that when officers are lawfully present in a protected area, the Fourth Amendment concern is the initial intrusion into the home or curtilage, not every subsequent arrest that follows.

Justices questioned both sides about factual findings and appellate review. One justice asked whether "how it was said that day is a factual question, is it not?" and whether the court of appeals or this court may second-guess a trial court's factual finding about voluntariness. Lorello responded that he doubted the trial court had made an explicit factual finding on the key point and urged the court to review the recording for tone and demeanor; Williams countered that the trial court reasonably could find the encounter consensual and that appellate review should defer unless the finding was plainly wrong.

The parties also debated how Supreme Court and Virginia precedent applies. Counsel discussed Payton v. New York, Collins v. Virginia, New York v. Harris and state cases the appellant cited (Young v. Commonwealth and Smith v. Commonwealth) about whether implied-consent breath testing requires a lawful arrest. Lorello argued that if the seizure or arrest was unlawful, then subsequent statements, field sobriety tests and the breath test could be subject to suppression; Williams urged the court to distinguish Harris and analogous cases and to treat the officers' lawful presence on the curtilage as dispositive.

No decision was issued from the bench. Counsel reserved and requested rebuttal time; after final questions the court adjourned. The justices will issue a written opinion resolving whether the encounter on the curtilage became a seizure that requires suppression of the contested evidence and how Virginia law applies to arrests that occur on a home's curtilage when officers were initially present under an implied license or consent.