The Massachusetts Appeals Court heard argument in Kamal v. Jorge Castillo (2024-0341) over whether testimony about "15 to 20" additional uncharged incidents and a prosecutor's descriptive closing statement improperly prejudiced the jury.

William Foreman, counsel for the defendant, urged the panel that testimony about many additional incidents was an amorphous, prejudicial "blanket statement" that left the defense unable to respond: "It's essentially a blanket statement that there were other incidents that took place," Foreman told the panel, saying the defense could not fairly rebut unspecified allegations and that the number and vagueness made defense preparation and cross-examination impossible.

Foreman argued the evidence was not sufficiently specific to fit the narrow exceptions that allow admission of other-act evidence (identity, motive, intent, plan, absence of mistake). He also challenged a prosecutor remark characterized in argument as describing the defendant's home as a "house of horrors," urging the court to consider whether cumulative rulings and rhetoric created a "substantial risk of miscarriage of justice."

Andrew Covington, who tried the case for the Commonwealth and also served as the trial prosecutor, told the panel the Commonwealth presented strong testimonial evidence, including a first-complaint statement from two young sisters and testimony from a witness who saw an assault. Covington said the trial judge admitted the uncharged conduct for limited nonpropensity purposes and gave limiting instructions both during testimony and again at the close of evidence. On the contested language, he said the phrase was a rhetorical characterization supported by the evidence and by prior SJC authority in homicide contexts. "The jury's decision in this case, which was a split verdict, shows that they weren't unfairly prejudiced by this evidence," Covington argued.

Why it matters: admission of uncharged sexual-assault allegations and prosecutorial rhetoric raises classic Rule 404(b)/Molineux-style questions about whether the probative value for identity, intent, or relationship outweighs the risk of unfair prejudice.

The panel asked whether specificity would have been helpful and whether the jury's mixed verdict (acquittal on at least one count and convictions on others) indicated lack of a miscarriage of justice. Foreman said the jury's split verdict did not eliminate the risk created by vague, numerous allegations and that the cumulative weight of the testimony and arguable rhetoric could have tipped the scales improperly.

Ending: The court reserved decision. The written opinion will resolve whether admission of the uncharged-conduct testimony or any prosecutorial statements requires reversal.