[{"_1":2,"_111":-5,"_112":-5},"loaderData",{"_3":4,"_26":27},"root",{"_5":6,"_17":10,"_18":19,"_20":21,"_22":10,"_23":-5,"_24":-5,"_25":10},"user",{"_7":8,"_9":10,"_11":10,"_12":-5,"_13":-5,"_14":15,"_16":-5},"roles",[],"isAuthenticated",false,"isPremium","planName","subscriptionStatus","featureFlags",{},"insightsBudget","isDevelopmentHost","userPreferences",{},"recaptchaSiteKey","6LcvOJcUAAAAAHsB-gPGfGktcRlKpH7OTIU_dMTD","isImpersonating","impersonation","affiliateStatus","isFreedomPortal","routes/v2/article/layout",{"_28":29,"_30":31},"notFound",true,"relatedArticles",[32,75,87,99],{"_33":34,"_35":36,"_37":38,"_39":40,"_41":42,"_43":44,"_45":46,"_47":48,"_49":50,"_51":52,"_53":54,"_55":56,"_57":58,"_59":60,"_61":62,"_63":64,"_65":66,"_67":68,"_69":70,"_71":72,"_73":72,"_74":72},"mediaId",6238346,"mediaKeyId","3352733-f34620cc0cb946339333478fd335c69a","parentId",3352733,"title","House panel seeks clarity on reported pause in offensive cyber operations and role on disinformation","audioSeconds",1230,"startMs",2954000,"endMs",4184000,"viewUrl","/Search/View?dp=1&key=3352733-f34620cc0cb946339333478fd335c69a&start=2954&end=4184","thumbnailUrl","https://assets.pipeline.soar.com/3352733-f34620cc0cb946339333478fd335c69a/thumbnail_2954000.jpg","articleUrl","/articles/6238346/House-panel-seeks-clarity-on-reported-pause-in-offensive-cyber-operations-and-role-on-disinformation","mediaUrl","https://secure.pipeline.soar.com/6238346-69f35a544cb463cd680bb512580116f6/orig.mp4?Expires=1770509029&Signature=BO0n9q0ZrwiV7dZGYVqmHxFzfQV-al-CMRSd6OxXhSFeDH2uabGnaj3Y-FlQq~4NqbCJx1FL8SCCdIHYtZEjmZCkSnRgsFnZa3D9FeAuV9kwgEuwwCN1BhNQkthluPbEZCT06OMdw7KaQoxKcsyJXkJ1RrOLT1xiRal1YM1ipnu3LsFvVu9pvnW~pv93oV2a2WNHpm8JhgTLHluDluKVs-6ffzhtacVdLmXPTIJEY3a7vGFHFB2WD2mluAFAvhKq0HohKCiBoeh2VyiGqYeKTkZaHap4KslH4kB4kXcNJrBMhoPFmXkBZSm~Hz1msWeEBE1luNnmqGEooiLg-oMWeQ__&Key-Pair-Id=KUT5TJCACFTXG","author","U.S. House Armed Services Committee","date","2025-05-17T02:10:29Z","article","House lawmakers on May 16 pressed Defense Department witnesses about reports that offensive cyber operations against Russia had been paused and about Cyber Command's role in countering foreign disinformation.

Lede: Multiple members asked whether the department had issued stand‑down or pause orders for offensive actions against foreign adversaries and whether Cyber Command engages in operations to counter disinformation; witnesses said they could not discuss operational specifics in open session and that Cyber Command has not executed operations specifically to counter disinformation.

Why it matters: Members said public reporting of pauses in operations and mixed public statements from DOD had created confusion about whether the United States was limiting cyber activities against near‑peer adversaries. One member told the panel he had dug into the matter and characterized it as a \"one day pause,\" while another asked witnesses to confirm the secretary did not issue a stand‑down order. Witnesses declined to confirm or discuss operational details in the open hearing.

What witnesses said: Bucout said she could not discuss operational matters in open session. Hartman said he was \"not aware of any stand on operations ordered at that time\" and that he would discuss operational authorities and policy in the closed session. On disinformation, Hartman said Cyber Command \"has never executed operations to counter disinformation,\" though he described the command's focus on malicious foreign cyber actors whose activity can enable influence operations.

Allies and partnerships: Members also asked about cooperation with allies beyond the Five Eyes and whether partners such as India should be more integrated on intelligence and cyber cooperation. Hartman said Cyber Command interacts with a range of partners daily, not only Five Eyes, and that bilateral relationships are evaluated where mutual benefit exists; he deferred policy questions to the director of national intelligence and the administration.

Next steps: Witnesses said authorities and policy questions require further closed‑session discussion with the committee. Committee members said they will seek follow‑up classified briefings and expect clearer public communications on operational posture where appropriate.","mediaType","Video","parentTitle","CITI Hearing: Fiscal Year 2026 Review of the Department of Defense’s Cyber Posture (May 2025)","oneSentenceSummary","Members pressed DOD witnesses on whether offensive cyber operations were paused against Russia, and asked whether Cyber Command targets disinformation; witnesses declined to discuss operational specifics in open session and said Cyber Command does not execute disinformation operations.","taxTitle","Armed Services: House Committee, Standing Committees - House & Senate, Congressional Hearings Compilation, Legislative, Federal","taxId",1833,"location","","headline","shortSummary",{"_33":76,"_35":36,"_37":38,"_39":77,"_41":78,"_43":79,"_45":80,"_47":81,"_49":82,"_51":83,"_53":84,"_55":56,"_57":58,"_59":85,"_61":62,"_63":64,"_65":86,"_67":68,"_69":70,"_71":72,"_73":72,"_74":72},6238350,"DOD witnesses tell House panel workforce management, hiring freeze and mental‑health support are top cyber priorities",942,3502000,4444000,"/Search/View?dp=1&key=3352733-f34620cc0cb946339333478fd335c69a&start=3502&end=4444","https://assets.pipeline.soar.com/3352733-f34620cc0cb946339333478fd335c69a/thumbnail_3502000.jpg","/articles/6238350/DOD-witnesses-tell-House-panel-workforce-management-hiring-freeze-and-mentalhealth-support-are-top-cyber-priorities","https://secure.pipeline.soar.com/6238350-d567b65f39eaa3fd65aa734a2853c397/orig.mp4?Expires=1770509029&Signature=U3FFFHCWWNv8s5KjWsEq3d8kNVPVoNqD37ACOQ6wo6fR8xbW3YYJ9aceW8v8BgzOv2kDiCukslpA4uqffkq8il2gjSXs4h-FS9V~tyIxaWTkuNRMNJW7Axn5z0gZ~JP6scmPk~MqPO2YVgFvqrxeJid3QbzYvv-8xXRu~BBGybwR2J7pdOWJ5yVkabvnDRxeh9UolKkA4BV21H7ElHKXSxRLbzLnogPiZ7UiazjCS~0Q3jdrR-buVxOXyKlicZRPXu2Aw1WE9sPoR7IaDrajg6MC9plqdWxwtBUk6lAIe64HprBA8k5ZNzfHwsk8v3X20PTWKcxbhABN5aMpzLNYug__&Key-Pair-Id=KUT5TJCACFTXG","Department of Defense witnesses told the House Armed Services Cyber Subcommittee on May 16 that talent management and personnel resiliency are central to maintaining cyber operations and that they are taking specific steps to reduce harms from recent workforce‑shaping actions.

The most newsworthy point: Lieutenant General Joe Hartman said Cyber Command's top priority is \"talent management, and ensuring that we can build mastery in the force,\" and described retention success in key cyber roles and active efforts to improve hiring and training pipelines.

What members asked: Lawmakers pressed witnesses about the effects of a recent hiring freeze, workforce‑shaping measures, and separations. Representative Elfreth asked how many employees left as a percent of the workforce; Hartman said the target for separations was 5 to 8 percent and that no probationary employees were terminated as a result of the workforce actions. Members repeatedly expressed concern about the national security risk from poorly handled separations and about the difficulty of competing with higher private‑sector pay.

What witnesses reported: Hartman said Cyber Command has generally achieved strong retention for \"key work roles\" (operators, exploitation analysts, and code writers) and that the command has contingency plans in place to cover expected departures. He said Cyber Command has made progress in offering incentive pay for military and civilian personnel and that recruiting benefits from the mission itself, not solely from compensation. Bucout said the department is examining a \"cyber‑accepted workforce\" under the DOD CIO to bring in needed talent despite the hiring freeze.

Mental health and occupational resiliency: Committee members cited a congressionally directed evaluation that found organic resources were insufficient for cyber operators' occupational resiliency. Hartman said Cyber Command has taken steps, including hiring its first psychologist, partnering with other agencies for occupational health, and planning additional support; he agreed to provide a written plan on timetables and measures.

Recruiting and training innovations: Witnesses described an artificial intelligence roadmap and pilot programs to accelerate operations and highlighted partnerships with the services and the National Security Agency to access technical capabilities. Hartman also noted that prior efforts had shortened civilian hiring timelines by about 45 percent before recent workforce shaping.

Why it matters: Members repeatedly tied workforce quality and care to national security, arguing that losing talent or failing to address mental‑health needs damages long‑term recruiting and retention.

Next steps: Witnesses agreed to provide additional information to the committee, including a written plan on occupational resiliency and petitioned changes or exemptions to hiring restrictions where necessary to preserve mission‑critical billets.","Witnesses told the House Cyber Subcommittee that talent management — including recruitment, retention, hiring‑freeze impacts, and mental‑health support — remains Cyber Command's top priority, and described ongoing steps to manage billet needs and workforce resilience.",{"_33":88,"_35":36,"_37":38,"_39":89,"_41":90,"_43":91,"_45":92,"_47":93,"_49":94,"_51":95,"_53":96,"_55":56,"_57":58,"_59":97,"_61":62,"_63":64,"_65":98,"_67":68,"_69":70,"_71":72,"_73":72,"_74":72},6238355,"Pentagon witnesses describe relook at 'Cybercom 2' and favor service‑like model to build cyber mastery",62,2624000,2686000,"/Search/View?dp=1&key=3352733-f34620cc0cb946339333478fd335c69a&start=2624&end=2686","https://assets.pipeline.soar.com/3352733-f34620cc0cb946339333478fd335c69a/thumbnail_2624000.jpg","/articles/6238355/Pentagon-witnesses-describe-relook-at-Cybercom-2-and-favor-servicelike-model-to-build-cyber-mastery","https://secure.pipeline.soar.com/6238355-f4a5fb1dff9f2c3ddcfbd6bb3c342f85/orig.mp4?Expires=1770509029&Signature=mO5XsUQyW5wYqAdXgsiEsqShYkI4BPJap8xtcG-hkAhI7uV5nDv4xZwu7fs7a3qWLtz-gj-QJgTsZWmkwz8YlHQmu7YG3YVBYIp0ydTzwDbp6KN2Wnvww8IGpazoJzYormvv1~NOWy5gVfQx-cFKhodFbwEGzE9Xilnfw0LtbvimgkkmEaVABMHwc1MNLU5-rLKhWSCgJNtMVLY9jOth8cV9GLIIxGDYpsQfVxaCpByftqM8bVx2pJZq8k0jC9mhzO3soU2hGFGkeI8jA4W3H6Bvo727ILsjY0pwbWUY7VP0Dowp7of7Oq4rV-amQNlsAoMCb9xcu2fqzqgh~ahMmQ__&Key-Pair-Id=KUT5TJCACFTXG","Senior Defense Department witnesses told the House Armed Services Cyber Subcommittee on May 16 that the department is revisiting the so‑called Cybercom 2 workforce and force‑presentation effort and favors a model that preserves service contributions while centralizing operational training.

The most important point up front: Department officials said they evaluated three models — status quo, a Special Operations Command (SOCOM)‑style model, and the creation of a separate cyber force — and that an operational planning team recommended a SOCOM‑like model as the preferred option to develop mastery across the cyber force.

Why it matters: Witnesses said the SOCOM‑style approach would let Cyber Command manage common training and build specialized skills more rapidly, while still relying on the military services to present trained personnel. \"Our preference was the SOCOM like model,\" Lieutenant General Joe Hartman said, adding that Cyber Command already organizes components and sub‑unified commands and could use those authorities to scale training and mastery.

Readiness and metrics: Members pressed witnesses on readiness, and one lawmaker noted the service cyber components only recently attained \"foundational readiness standards,\" a status the chair said took more than a dozen years to achieve. Witnesses said that Congress should receive meaningful and accurate readiness metrics and that Cyber Command will continue to work with the services to improve talent management, training quality, and retention.

Budget and authorities: Hartman told the panel that, in fiscal year 2024, Cyber Command responsibly managed more than $2,500,000,000 and that tighter alignment of authorities and accountability had sped decision timelines. Bucout said the department is enhancing acquisition pathways to buy software and nontraditional suppliers more effectively.

Legal and procedural note: The witnesses said Congress requested an analysis under the National Defense Authorization Act requirement referenced during questioning (referred to in the hearing as \"NDA section 15 33\") and that Cyber Command formed an operational planning team to evaluate options.

Next steps and oversight: Witnesses said they will take the committee's concerns into account while conducting a deeper review of Cybercom 2; members asked for additional briefings and classified discussion about authorities and operations. Lawmakers emphasized the need for a model that can quickly produce operationally ready personnel while avoiding organizational friction between the services and the command.

Members also asked that readiness metrics reported to Congress be \"meaningful, accurate, and honest\" so the committee can target resources and oversight appropriately.","Witnesses told the House Cyber Subcommittee that the Pentagon is reexamining the Cybercom 2 workforce and force‑presentation model and that Cyber Command and DOD evaluated three models, with a SOCOM‑style approach preferred to build a more 'mastery'‑focused cyber force.",{"_33":100,"_35":36,"_37":38,"_39":101,"_41":102,"_43":103,"_45":104,"_47":105,"_49":106,"_51":107,"_53":108,"_55":56,"_57":58,"_59":109,"_61":62,"_63":64,"_65":110,"_67":68,"_69":70,"_71":72,"_73":72,"_74":72},6238360,"House cyber subcommittee presses Pentagon for explanation after sudden removal of cyber commander",1802,1102000,2904000,"/Search/View?dp=1&key=3352733-f34620cc0cb946339333478fd335c69a&start=1102&end=2904","https://assets.pipeline.soar.com/3352733-f34620cc0cb946339333478fd335c69a/thumbnail_1102000.jpg","/articles/6238360/House-cyber-subcommittee-presses-Pentagon-for-explanation-after-sudden-removal-of-cyber-commander","https://secure.pipeline.soar.com/6238360-0c4703226a1b9e61c20b92a83100a75a/orig.mp4?Expires=1770509029&Signature=K0fG62y0V4OBn5rvYNEuLa2TKunzIgbsdZ5p-7kIzz9MW8BaZJZKpJd2al0IBv~abyIsvLTfwVS3tNhBLMnrbNjrFP8EoNRPA6bhWdvi94HrJKfICXRtFMB2PsLxJWC2Ywk7HiXE8BHs3yAtj5y8fp5MfS1xqg8LQMOrSwLQKWb7Yva~hdDR-HR9L2jqGslzeFA-JMFm0VRYAT920V6f-1GuMrsOA8LvN5VMf-DV1pcJhn8TLUfvQwmEDsYEmUXR1lAByLCt~AjhaYhd8ZzUjSdkVRQWWUL7ou~tUdyC-rv-iB5wxXQJhtm1P58x2wQpEG9R42uZvKAmDLaOavI0Og__&Key-Pair-Id=KUT5TJCACFTXG","House Armed Services Cyber Subcommittee members on May 16 pressed senior Defense Department witnesses for answers about the unexplained removal of the previous commander of U.S. Cyber Command and called on the secretary of defense to appear and explain the rationale.

The removal, which members said occurred six weeks earlier, prompted bipartisan concern that the action harmed morale at Cyber Command and created operational uncertainty. \"Removing him from the cyber battlefield in this way served absolutely no national security interest,\" a committee member said, urging the secretary of defense to answer for the decision when next before the committee.

Why it matters: The subcommittee framed the leadership change as an oversight issue because Cyber Command and the National Security Agency (NSA) are central to U.S. defensive and offensive cyber operations. Several members said the removal sent an alarming message to rivals and to the cyber workforce. \"This is utterly unacceptable and a sign of the cavalier lack of professionalism from this administration,\" one member said, adding that the unexplained action \"puts our citizens at risk\" and harms morale.

What witnesses said: Neither witness present — Lori Bucout, performing the duties of the assistant secretary of defense for cyber policy, and Lieutenant General Joe Hartman, acting commander of U.S. Cyber Command — claimed authority to discuss personnel decisions made by the secretary. Bucout said she could not address operational specifics in an open forum and deferred to senior leadership where appropriate. Hartman told the panel he was focused on maintaining mission continuity and that he and his command were continuing operations.

Committee requests and next steps: Members repeatedly said they expect the secretary of defense to testify and provide a full explanation of the removal and any related personnel actions. The subcommittee chair characterized the matter as one that the secretary will \"have to answer for\" and several members said they would press for additional briefings and for the secretary to appear before the committee.

Context and balance: Committee members emphasized they did not fault the two witnesses for the personnel decision and thanked them for their service. Witnesses told members they are working to maintain Cyber Command operations and to minimize workforce disruption while congressional oversight continues.

The hearing record shows persistent, cross‑aisle concern about both transparency and operational impact; the subcommittee signaled it will seek further information from the secretary of defense.","Members of the House Armed Services Cyber Subcommittee pressed Department of Defense witnesses on May 16 for a public explanation of the sudden removal of the previous U.S. Cyber Command commander, and warned the unexplained change has damaged morale and raised operational concerns.","actionData","errors"]

Article not found

House panel seeks clarity on reported pause in offensive cyber operations and role on disinformation

DOD witnesses tell House panel workforce management, hiring freeze and mental‑health support are top cyber priorities

Pentagon witnesses describe relook at 'Cybercom 2' and favor service‑like model to build cyber mastery

House cyber subcommittee presses Pentagon for explanation after sudden removal of cyber commander