[{"_1":2,"_99":-5,"_100":-5},"loaderData",{"_3":4,"_26":27},"root",{"_5":6,"_17":10,"_18":19,"_20":21,"_22":10,"_23":-5,"_24":-5,"_25":10},"user",{"_7":8,"_9":10,"_11":10,"_12":-5,"_13":-5,"_14":15,"_16":-5},"roles",[],"isAuthenticated",false,"isPremium","planName","subscriptionStatus","featureFlags",{},"insightsBudget","isDevelopmentHost","userPreferences",{},"recaptchaSiteKey","6LcvOJcUAAAAAHsB-gPGfGktcRlKpH7OTIU_dMTD","isImpersonating","impersonation","affiliateStatus","isFreedomPortal","routes/v2/article/layout",{"_28":29,"_30":31},"notFound",true,"relatedArticles",[32,75,87],{"_33":34,"_35":36,"_37":38,"_39":40,"_41":42,"_43":44,"_45":46,"_47":48,"_49":50,"_51":52,"_53":54,"_55":56,"_57":58,"_59":60,"_61":62,"_63":64,"_65":66,"_67":68,"_69":70,"_71":72,"_73":72,"_74":72},"mediaId",6376107,"mediaKeyId","2140550-9c40c7faccad6dbc9512530e0e66d811","parentId",2140550,"title","Witnesses urge clearer deterrence, more offensive operations and expanded guard cyber units; AI seen as force multiplier","audioSeconds",2884,"startMs",606000,"endMs",3490000,"viewUrl","/Search/View?dp=1&key=2140550-9c40c7faccad6dbc9512530e0e66d811&start=606&end=3490","thumbnailUrl","https://assets.pipeline.soar.com/2140550-9c40c7faccad6dbc9512530e0e66d811/thumbnail_606000.jpg","articleUrl","/articles/6376107/Witnesses-urge-clearer-deterrence-more-offensive-operations-and-expanded-guard-cyber-units-AI-seen-as-force-multiplier","mediaUrl","https://secure.pipeline.soar.com/6376107-06245b3e0dce0e8ab1df88954e1fca90/orig.mp4?Expires=1771142658&Signature=J-cpjFlqQ~FeUloDPCp2yQKD1Ok42JvINJmp1y5I9t3PqNQxtRWHqLWjlioB7rpwFM3UZyuEWZ1X1Ea0GL7qTspOW5aAYuoN3IMGmQtK735e8K5k-six63dvkNNukfVGy19kDKk1lWy8H4k3ThoMKNp9Bw9fSHqvIq4nI3vGZIkuz-s2aCQ59a80jtk4gYUQLNOuej7Yp1RKC1cVE1l~DeZ6~S5IVdp2-oOs23CIZ42l6fEqnB4OPtkUUzWumpm0AcmNcqD3xMG6d4ZeXcUjT~~x7fTGA~d2XTWJgRQ8WhCcOgFa6b3OPX6DwgmPIkQP0EJcm2~ix~suSed4q-uvOQ__&Key-Pair-Id=KUT5TJCACFTXG","author","U.S. House Committee on Homeland Security","date","2025-01-22T18:25:20Z","article","Committee members and witnesses debated the role of offensive cyber operations, the National Guard’s role in domestic cyber defense, and the promise and risks of artificial intelligence in cybersecurity.

Several witnesses and members urged a more aggressive posture to impose costs on adversaries. Rear Admiral Mark Montgomery said the United States should “publicly execute operations against Chinese cyber infrastructure to say, we know you did this,” arguing that public attribution and removal of adversary infrastructure would deter further behavior even if it sacrifices an intelligence access.

Witnesses described two complementary deterrence approaches: “deterrence by denial,” meaning stronger defenses and resilience, and “deterrence by punishment,” meaning the ability to impose costs on adversaries through offensive operations. Adam Myers recommended increasing the tempo of coordinated operations that have previously degraded threat‑actor capabilities and said Congress should perform oversight to ensure agencies pursue such operations and that resources are aligned.

Congressional members pressed the panel on the National Guard and other state assets. Chairman Green said he plans to sponsor an amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act to create a National Guard cyber defense unit in every state; Montgomery supported the idea, saying governors have specific authorities and local relationships that make Guard units useful for domestic response and resilience.

On artificial intelligence, witnesses said AI and machine learning are already integrated into defensive tools and can rapidly improve detection and response. “We’ve been using machine learning and artificial intelligence for the last 14 years at CrowdStrike,” Myers said, and panelists argued that AI can make junior analysts more effective. Several witnesses also warned that adversaries will seek to weaponize AI and that protecting AI model assets will be a national‑security priority.

Members also raised concerns about legal authorities to “hack back.” Witnesses and members were divided on privately authorized offensive action. Montgomery recommended building a dedicated cyber force (analogous to a military service) to conduct offensive operations in the long term; he preferred government‑led capabilities or tightly controlled contractor engagements rather than broadly authorizing private companies to strike back under a letters‑of‑marque model.

Why this matters: Witnesses said a balanced approach — stronger defenses, clearer authority for coordinated offensive operations, expanded state and Guard cyber capabilities, and investment in AI — is necessary to raise the cost to adversaries and protect critical services.","mediaType","Video","parentTitle","Unconstrained Actors: Assessing Global Cyber Threats to the Homeland","oneSentenceSummary","Panelists said deterrence requires operations that impose costs on adversaries, recommended publicly attributed operations to remove Chinese footholds, and supported adding National Guard cyber units and investing in AI to scale defense — while warning of attendant risks.","taxTitle","Homeland Security: House Committee, Standing Committees - House & Senate, Congressional Hearings Compilation, Legislative, Federal","taxId",1831,"location","","headline","shortSummary",{"_33":76,"_35":36,"_37":38,"_39":77,"_41":78,"_43":79,"_45":80,"_47":81,"_49":82,"_51":83,"_53":84,"_55":56,"_57":58,"_59":85,"_61":62,"_63":64,"_65":86,"_67":68,"_69":70,"_71":72,"_73":72,"_74":72},6376112,"Committee urged to protect CISA funding and reauthorize state and local cybersecurity grants; witnesses back workforce bills",4975,829000,5804000,"/Search/View?dp=1&key=2140550-9c40c7faccad6dbc9512530e0e66d811&start=829&end=5804","https://assets.pipeline.soar.com/2140550-9c40c7faccad6dbc9512530e0e66d811/thumbnail_829000.jpg","/articles/6376112/Committee-urged-to-protect-CISA-funding-and-reauthorize-state-and-local-cybersecurity-grants-witnesses-back-workforce-bills","https://secure.pipeline.soar.com/6376112-7669649f20ee5513f3ee59cc3c9299f0/orig.mp4?Expires=1771142658&Signature=IZspZpktx2wI7NOJj51aYjp1K~z4Z3rSmhvXq5~-lCyDsqMjmappp3LNlv3sRNdyrMy3V6yxAV0uLiq4e6Sywda0BfPq3p1JqGO1Zsfn3yBd8d6VyooyT4Hq1OpeYdfj2a~IcGiTYB1UdelMwEVlMSHVAASx6lm3F2w9HWfjuq1wved3S--HCqRsvWut8sZnckFdM1RDwEVaoUWhhDNiOS7ezqC9QkA2IDReX13AAdwKPZLX108-ACdIks3RXk9XVVL9acJB0Xqx15T8pmegfiVeMp-cCC9vyMEAbxIRLGFKoe8vx5C43YGqyJYOiCW1ayiy4ltUbJPp6zzCkt2sTg__&Key-Pair-Id=KUT5TJCACFTXG","Members of the House Homeland Security Committee and witnesses debated the role and resourcing of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), federal grant programs for state and local governments, and workforce legislation to close an acute shortage of cybersecurity personnel.

Ranking Member Thompson reviewed the law that created CISA and said bipartisan Congresses built the agency’s authorities and funding. He warned that proposals to curtail CISA would undermine those efforts and stressed the agency’s role in resisting nation‑state threats. “We have to be clear‑eyed about the enormous task ahead,” Thompson said, referencing a history of bipartisan support for CISA’s mission.

Brandon Wales, vice president for cybersecurity strategy at Centennial 1 and former acting executive director of CISA, told members the agency “is essential both because it has unique sets of authorities and resources to tackle this problem.” He suggested CISA should be the sector risk‑management lead and receive clearer authority to coordinate across federal agencies and with the private sector.

Witnesses repeatedly urged Congress to reauthorize statutory tools that enable industry and government to share cyber threat information. Kimba Walden recommended Congress reauthorize the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 and strengthen liability protections for defensive information sharing that helps public‑private coordination.

Multiple panelists endorsed reauthorizing and expanding the state and local cybersecurity grant program created by the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law and asked Congress to extend that funding stream, which one witness said “expires in September.” The program, witnesses said, funds technical assistance and can address legacy technical debt among local governments, schools and utilities.

Workforce was a recurring theme. Mark Montgomery and others endorsed the Cyber Pivot Act — legislation from the prior Congress intended to scale hiring and apprenticeship pathways into public‑sector cyber roles. Montgomery said the United States must “hire more talent for federal, state and local governments” and suggested vocational and community‑college pathways.

Committee members asked witnesses about CISA’s information‑sharing mechanisms, the Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative (JCDC), and whether additional authorities or funding are needed. Wales and other witnesses said JCDC needs real‑time capabilities beyond a “Slack channel” and recommended statutory authorization to give the collaborative planning, information‑sharing and operational elements needed for faster, operational cooperation.

Why this matters: Witnesses linked effective incident response and prevention to sustained funding for CISA, statutory authorities that encourage private‑sector sharing, and a much larger cyber workforce. Several members said shortfalls in these areas increase vulnerability across state and local governments and critical infrastructure.","Committee members and witnesses urged continued support for the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), reauthorization of the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act and the state and local cybersecurity grant program, and passage of workforce legislation such as the Cyber Pivot Act to address staffing shortages.",{"_33":88,"_35":36,"_37":38,"_39":89,"_41":90,"_43":91,"_45":92,"_47":93,"_49":94,"_51":95,"_53":96,"_55":56,"_57":58,"_59":97,"_61":62,"_63":64,"_65":98,"_67":68,"_69":70,"_71":72,"_73":72,"_74":72},6376116,"Witnesses at Homeland Security hearing say China has prepositioned on U.S. critical infrastructure",5181,467000,5648000,"/Search/View?dp=1&key=2140550-9c40c7faccad6dbc9512530e0e66d811&start=467&end=5648","https://assets.pipeline.soar.com/2140550-9c40c7faccad6dbc9512530e0e66d811/thumbnail_467000.jpg","/articles/6376116/Witnesses-at-Homeland-Security-hearing-say-China-has-prepositioned-on-US-critical-infrastructure","https://secure.pipeline.soar.com/6376116-0ba6d9292c31de0a21efb2ab906ec6f2/orig.mp4?Expires=1771142658&Signature=SZkEaxSTrZY2QkjxyhyJm~4ylogPsfpwtTs-ZIj9wNyfrN0BdYiGOue8PftNUQsM~bYEZyBfVq1ga3cTi8nEQxBrVdGrQn6jLjZ3HbeSVXoTSRPbyX9nrkRZ096yFjlNfhunmf9ByNOf15gtfpXEr9He9Y84pn4IPrFaQ1txROIXxBmPlD0tEjm1y2DkYM4J7DZ-zwW1-VcjP3avqNPTlgcM4lss1p8F~mN~RPsOuasBgP8TpruUZshnCqXn7RKDxns22hUEmooL7yAyTKa84Iv-wGc~EpIDqv9p9OGOfRCe~51pyOtAw2ZhuDNqfQUVgRA1YQG2BJTirWl85HHQkQ__&Key-Pair-Id=KUT5TJCACFTXG","The House Committee on Homeland Security heard testimony from private-sector experts and former federal officials who said Chinese state-linked cyber operations have ‘‘prepositioned’’ access to U.S. critical infrastructure and pose a risk of disruptive or destructive attacks.

Chairman Green opened the hearing saying the panel would “delve into the risk posed by the People’s Republic of China, which has burrowed into our critical infrastructure and compromised our telecommunications networks.” He added that cyberspace “is increasingly becoming a digital battlefield.”

Adam Myers, senior vice president for counteradversary operations at CrowdStrike, told the committee that China’s cyber programs have matured. “After over a decade of investing in programs to strengthen their cyber capabilities, China has matured to achieve at least parity with other world cyberpowers,” Myers said, citing recent campaigns aimed at upstream collection and targeting of U.S. officials and enterprises.

Rear Admiral Mark Montgomery, senior director at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, described operations that industry and U.S. agencies have tracked as prepositioning. “This malware lies in wait, ready to disrupt and destroy U.S. systems at a time of Beijing’s choosing,” Montgomery said, adding that the campaign has affected ports, energy systems and water utilities.

Witnesses listed several tracked actor clusters by industry nickname — for example, “Vanguard/Volt Typhoon,” “Salt Typhoon,” and “Liminal Panda” — and said some activity targets telecommunications and the technology supply chain. Myers told the committee that Chinese operations have moved from espionage toward capability to conduct disruptive operations, and that intrusions indicating prepositioning increased substantially in the previous year across multiple sectors.

Panelists and members emphasized the difference between government and private ownership of infrastructure. Montgomery noted that U.S. military mobility depends on private-sector ports, airports and rail lines and said the private sector will need both technical and financial assistance to harden those systems. Kimba Walden, president of the Paladin Global Institute and former acting national cyber director, said the private sector must be part of the solution while the federal government clarifies roles and provides workforce and technical support.

Members pressed witnesses on what a credible response should look like. Myers recommended accelerating coordinated operations that disrupt adversary infrastructure and increase the tempo of defensive and offensive work. Montgomery urged public attribution and operations that remove adversary footholds even if doing so sacrifices an intelligence access, arguing public operations could deter further prepositioning.

The witnesses uniformly stressed that the activity remains ongoing: Myers told the committee that “Salt Typhoon is an ongoing activity by an adversary,” and that the United States must continuously identify and cut off access.

Why this matters: Committee members and witnesses framed the activity as more than espionage — in several witnesses’ words it is “operational preparation of the battlefield,” meaning actors have implanted capabilities in networks that could be turned to destructive ends in a crisis. Members said those findings shape congressional priorities for oversight, funding, and legislation aimed at resilience and deterrence.","Experts and former officials told the House Homeland Security Committee that Chinese state-linked cyber actors have long-established footholds inside U.S. networks that support ports, energy, telecommunications and other critical systems, and that those footholds could be used to disrupt services during a crisis.","actionData","errors"]

Article not found

Witnesses urge clearer deterrence, more offensive operations and expanded guard cyber units; AI seen as force multiplier

Committee urged to protect CISA funding and reauthorize state and local cybersecurity grants; witnesses back workforce bills

Witnesses at Homeland Security hearing say China has prepositioned on U.S. critical infrastructure