US media faces growing influence from Chinese Communist Party tactics and disinformation campaigns
January 15, 2025 | Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Special, Select and Other Committees - House & Senate, Congressional Hearings Compilation
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The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence convened on January 15, 2025, for an open hearing to discuss the nomination of John L. Ratcliffe as the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The meeting focused on various aspects of national security, particularly the influence operations of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) targeting the United States.
The hearing began with remarks highlighting the findings from Freedom House's global media influence study, which examined the CCP's tactics across 30 countries. The study revealed that the CCP employs a range of complex strategies to influence media and information abroad, going beyond traditional propaganda. Five primary tactics were identified: propaganda, disinformation, censorship and intimidation, control over content distribution infrastructure, and attempts to export the CCP's model of information control.
The first significant point discussed was the presence of Beijing-backed content in mainstream U.S. media. This content often reaches American audiences through partnerships with local media, op-eds, and appearances by Chinese diplomats. Notably, it was reported that from 2019 to 2021, state-run media invested over $7 million to insert their narratives into U.S. publications, often without clear labeling.
Next, the committee addressed the covert tactics and disinformation campaigns being deployed on social media. It was noted that actors linked to the CCP have attempted to pay social media influencers to promote pro-Beijing content, covering topics from human rights issues in Xinjiang to claims about the origins of COVID-19. The sophistication of these campaigns has increased, utilizing generative artificial intelligence and content laundering techniques to obscure their origins.
The discussion then shifted to the growing use of coercive tactics by the CCP. Since 2019, there have been reports of aggressive restrictions on foreign correspondents in China, retaliation against families of U.S. journalists, and cyberattacks on major news outlets. Additionally, there have been instances of corporate pressure on journalists, leading to self-censorship due to fears of losing access to the Chinese market.
The committee also examined the efforts of CCP proxies to co-opt U.S. elites to disseminate Beijing's messages. One notable organization mentioned was the China US Exchange Foundation (CUSA), which has facilitated trips for U.S. journalists to China, raising concerns about its ties to the CCP's United Front work.
In conclusion, the hearing underscored the multifaceted nature of the CCP's influence operations in the United States and the need for vigilance in countering these efforts. The committee's discussions highlighted the importance of maintaining a resilient media landscape and protecting journalistic integrity in the face of foreign influence. The next steps will likely involve further investigations into these tactics and the development of strategies to mitigate their impact on U.S. national security.
The hearing began with remarks highlighting the findings from Freedom House's global media influence study, which examined the CCP's tactics across 30 countries. The study revealed that the CCP employs a range of complex strategies to influence media and information abroad, going beyond traditional propaganda. Five primary tactics were identified: propaganda, disinformation, censorship and intimidation, control over content distribution infrastructure, and attempts to export the CCP's model of information control.
The first significant point discussed was the presence of Beijing-backed content in mainstream U.S. media. This content often reaches American audiences through partnerships with local media, op-eds, and appearances by Chinese diplomats. Notably, it was reported that from 2019 to 2021, state-run media invested over $7 million to insert their narratives into U.S. publications, often without clear labeling.
Next, the committee addressed the covert tactics and disinformation campaigns being deployed on social media. It was noted that actors linked to the CCP have attempted to pay social media influencers to promote pro-Beijing content, covering topics from human rights issues in Xinjiang to claims about the origins of COVID-19. The sophistication of these campaigns has increased, utilizing generative artificial intelligence and content laundering techniques to obscure their origins.
The discussion then shifted to the growing use of coercive tactics by the CCP. Since 2019, there have been reports of aggressive restrictions on foreign correspondents in China, retaliation against families of U.S. journalists, and cyberattacks on major news outlets. Additionally, there have been instances of corporate pressure on journalists, leading to self-censorship due to fears of losing access to the Chinese market.
The committee also examined the efforts of CCP proxies to co-opt U.S. elites to disseminate Beijing's messages. One notable organization mentioned was the China US Exchange Foundation (CUSA), which has facilitated trips for U.S. journalists to China, raising concerns about its ties to the CCP's United Front work.
In conclusion, the hearing underscored the multifaceted nature of the CCP's influence operations in the United States and the need for vigilance in countering these efforts. The committee's discussions highlighted the importance of maintaining a resilient media landscape and protecting journalistic integrity in the face of foreign influence. The next steps will likely involve further investigations into these tactics and the development of strategies to mitigate their impact on U.S. national security.
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